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Many contemporary states and historic political entities walled their borders 
stressing the idea that these barriers would protect their homelands from external threats 
and thus, achieve security. Although this security argument has prevailed, the political 
science literature fails to offer a systematic empirical examination of the relationship 
between barriers and cross-border threats. This research attempts to bridge this gap by 
answering the question: What are the actual security outcomes of physical barriers on 
borders? And thus, under what conditions do barriers succeed/fail to achieve security? 
This paper posits that, in some cases, building barriers on borders to stop non-state 
actors’ attacks escalate conflict. It demonstrates that when militants have supply 
institutions, they will manage to increase their attacks and shift to new tactics despite the 
barrier. It also studies the Israeli Gaza Strip Fence and offers an analysis based on 
patterns of the relationships between features of the barrier and the Gaza attacks. these 
patterns are derived from a quantitative dataset built by the researcher and are also 
supplemented by qualitative data about the case. 
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On the night of December 12th 2004 and in a well-planned attack, Hamas and 
Fatah Hawks militants detonated a 1,500kg bomb in an 800-meters tunnel under an 
Israeli military base near the Egypt-Gaza borders. As a cover for the operation, mortars 
and Qassam rockets showered the area to distract the soldiers’ attention. Two Palestinian 
militants appeared from the tunnel and opened fire at the soldiers stationed in the 
location. A second explosion was heard in the same base right after the end of the 
operation (Macintyre, 2004; Barzak, 2004; O’Loughin, 2004: 8). This attack in of itself 
may not be of a great significance; however, it represents both the continuation of attacks 
from Gaza and an amalgamation of attack tactics Gaza militants have adopted in the past 
decade.  
Ten years prior to this attack, Israel was subjected to a wave of suicide bombings 
from different Palestinian areas in general and from the Gaza Strip in particular. Feeling 
in the midst of a tough situation, and sensing the urge and need for having to do 
something about it, the Israeli government launched a project to build a hi-tech and 
militarized fence on the borders with the Gaza Strip. The then Israeli Prime Minister, 
Yitshak Rabin stressed that this fence will stop Palestinian attacks inside Israel (Gold, 
1995:7; Borger, 2007). Knowing that the Gaza barrier is not the only Israeli separation 
project and that Israel is not the only state that has launched such projects, the question 
remains, what are the actual security outcomes of physical barriers on border? Do these 
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constructions actually stop attacks from the other side? Why? What explains the 
continuity of attacks at least in some cases as that of the Gaza Strip? 
This paper employs a single case study, the Gaza Israeli fence as a plausibility 
probe to determine the theory’s validity and applicability1. Gaza is not the only 
Palestinian zone involved in a conflict with Israel. Nevertheless, in the past five years, it 
has attracted more political, public and media attention due to its intense involvement in 
the conflict. I selected this case for two main reasons. First, Gaza is an extreme (most 
likely) case, because it has one of the strictest Israeli border controls and the most 
institutionalized militant groups. It presents high values the independent variable (barriers 
as intensified forms of border policing) and the intervening variable (militants institutions 
that provide war knowledge and material supplies), as well as the dependent variable 
(militants number of attacks and tactical shifts). A probe into the dynamics relating 
barriers on borders to militants’ institutions and escalation of conflict should thus offer 
clear, discernable results (on the logic of using an extreme case, see George & Bannett, 
2005: 120-3; for an example on similar studies see Van Evera, 1984; Atzili, 2006).  
Second, the Gaza Israeli barrier had been built and completed more than fifteen 
years ago, which offers sufficient time to examine it and its effect. Thus, the Israeli 
conflict with the Palestinians in the Gaza area is multifaceted in the sense that it offers 
many observation points although it is a single case. Because this study is an initial 
                                                
1 I use “Gaza” to refer to the Palestinian Gaza Strip in general, a sandy strip on the Mediterranean that 
stretches for 62 sq. km. It falls to the north-west of the Negev and is bordered by Israel from all sides 
except in the South, by Egypt (The World Factbook, 2011). The biggest city is Gaza city but other 
population centers in the area are Beit Hanun, Beit Lahya, Jabalya, Deir Balah, Khan Yunis, and Rafah. 
“Plausibility probes” are “preliminary studies on relatively untested theories and hypotheses to determine 
whether more intensive and laborious testing is warranted.” (See George & Bannett, 2005: 75-6). 
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probe, into a newly identified causal mechanism, however, and because it involves only 
one case, the ability to generalize from its findings should not be exaggerated.  
I seek to answer the above detailed questions in three main sections. The first part 
of this paper defines barriers on borders and discusses the evolving debate on their 
viability in achieving state security. This discussion revolves mainly around two main 
ideas on the mechanisms through which barriers achieve security and their failure to do 
so. Based on this debate, I develop new specific hypotheses about why in some cases 
militants sustain and may increase their attacks despite the barriers. I supplement these 
hypotheses from works on terrorist groups goals and institutions. I argue that in some 
cases, when militants have the will and the resources to attack, barriers will cause 
increase rather than decrease in violence.  
In the second section, I turn to the specifics the Gaza barrier case as a preliminary 
probe of the plausibility of the paper’s theory. The time period covered in this study is 
twenty years, from 1990 to 2010. I begin with a background on the case to provide the 
context and to examine specific patterns in attacks emanating from Gaza as well as 
development on the physical dimensions of the Israeli Gaza barrier. In this section, I also 
explore the development of Gaza’s smuggling networks that became the militants’ source 
of supplies and developed into institutions over time. Subsequently, I collect and present 
data on the Gaza attacks and variation in the Israeli policing dimensions of the Gaza 
fence. Reports from world newspapers available on LexisNexis, militant groups’ 
websites, and the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website enabled me to count attacks 
and their type. In turn, barrier dimensions data are collected from international 
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newspapers available on LexisNexis, the OCHA and Applied Research Institute-
Jerusalem (ARIJ) websites.  
Finally, in the last section, I use the theory and evidence developed and provided 
in this paper to draw tentative conclusions about the effect of barriers on borders on 

















Chapter 1: Literature Review and Hypotheses  
Walls and fences are commonly seen as constructions to protect a property and 
preserve privacy. If one travels various continents, and visits different countries with 
varying cultures and customs, s/he will still see fences and walls of different forms and 
types that are meant to serve the same aforementioned functions. In this regard, many cite 
the well-known poet, Robert Frost’s in his “Mending Wall,” in which he contends that 
good walls make good neighbors (1915). Political science has recently started to discuss 
walls and fences as a political phenomenon by mostly stressing their positive effect on 
the security of the state.  
Barriers are state-made obstacles, such as walls, fences, ditches and sand piles 
that create closure systems, which aim at controlling crossings to prevent undesirable 
cross-border movement (Rosière, 2009: 1). States and empires that built barriers assumed 
they protect their homeland by make it easy for them to defend (Jervis, 1978: 194), and 
deter external threats. Barriers are not merely walls or fences; they are systems of 
surveillance technologies, towers and weapons of different kinds. These systems may 
extend beyond the border into a web of control mechanisms on one or both sides of the 
borders. This chapter seeks to further elucidate the relationship between physical barriers 
on borders and security in the form of non-state actors’ cross border attacks. 
BARRIERS AND SECURITY  
States are not the first political entities to build barriers on their borders. Empires 
also, launched such constructions long before nationalism and the creation of the nation 
state. Just to mention a few examples, the Chinese built their known walls on their 
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northern frontiers to stop raids by the Mongols (Sterling, 2009:106), and the Greeks built 
Athens’ long Walls to eliminate the area’s vulnerability vis-à-vis Sparta (Ibid: 13). 
Recently, after the end of the Cold War, a diverse set of political, military, economic and 
social challenges have elevated the state’s sense of vulnerability in many different 
regions. These challenges include illegal immigration, narcotics, and terrorism. 
Motivated by a need to stop these threats, an increasing number of states resorted to 
fencing and walling their borders and the phenomenon have become a strikingly 
widespread practice (Sterling, 2009: 2; Rosière, 2009: 7).  
To illustrate contemporary cases, less than two decades ago Spain has built a 
fence around its enclaves, Cebta and Melilla to stop illegal immigration and drug 
trafficking, Israel is building a barrier in the West Bank to stop Palestinian attacks and 
Greece is considering a barrier on the borders with Turkey to stop flows of illegal 
immigration (Walterfield, 2011; Andreas, 2000). What is interesting about all those 
barriers is despite the variation in time and place; in all of the above-mentioned cases as 
well as others, different political entities, whether states or empires, predicted that their 
barrier policies would stop external threats.  
Despite the presence of fencing and walling for a long time in history and their 
proliferation today, so far, the scholarly literature had devoted little attention to theories 
regarding the role of physical barriers in cross-border security. The earliest work that 
discusses physical barriers however, is that of Robert Jervis (1978: 194) who posits that 
barriers, though he was referring to natural barriers, offer better chances for the states to 
punish attacks, and lower the efficiency of attackers. As will be detailed below, this logic 
became the corner stone for more recent works on the phenomenon. 
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Cross-border Violence and Barriers  
With the surge in terrorist attacks in the past decade and the development of a 
deterrence literature studying non-state actors2, and building on the conventional 
understanding of barriers proposed by Jervis, new contributions appeared in the political 
science literature. Most of these contributions argue that barriers reduce the frequency 
and intensity of non-state violence either by making it easy to punish attacks or by 
denying militants’ access to their targets (Kaufman, 1996; Makovsky, 2004; Pape, 2003; 
Dutter & Seliktar, 2007: 438). On the one hand, deterrence by punishment scholars base 
their arguments on Jervis’ assertions that barriers deter infiltrations first, by punishing 
those who try to cross the borders, and second, by increasing the costs of infiltrations as 
more logistics are required to infiltrate a border when there is a barrier (1978: 194; Dutter 
& Seliktar, 2007: 437). According to this view, perpetrators will be dissuaded from 
crossing the borders when barriers are built because they know they will be punished 
(Frey & Luechinger, 2003: 238-9).  
On the other hand, the deterrence by denial framework also takes off from ideas 
developed by Jervis when he said that barriers facilitate control, and lower the efficiency 
of infiltrators by making their progress slower and giving the defenders more time to 
prepare (Jervis: 1978: 194). These works demonstrate that the defender (i.e. the state who 
builds the barrier) denies the attackers (the none-state actor) the achievement of their 
objectives by denying him access to his target. Many proponents of this view contend 
that continuous barriers in this regard have the best prospects for reducing the frequency 
                                                
2 Non-state actors, militants, militant groups and insurgents are used interchangeably in this paper. They 
include militant groups that carry out attacks against a state. Other works may refer to these same groups as 
terrorist in nature. I refrain from doing so based on the preference to avoid value-laden expressions and use 
a more neutral terms.  
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and intensity of non-state attacks (Kaufman, 1996, 1998; Makovsky, 2004; Pape, 2003; 
Dutter & Seliktar, 2007: 438).  
Despite their contribution, these scholars have not yet significantly advanced an 
understanding of barriers as systems of defenses. Most of these works perceive barriers in 
the context of the defense-offence debate and posit that all else being equal, when offense 
has a greater military advantage, war is most likely to occur. By contrast, the greater the 
edge of defense, the more stable the international system is. In the minds of the states that 
build them, barriers are seen as defensive structures. As unmovable constructions, walls 
and fences may be presented as the most defensive systems, a commonly used argument 
used by politicians who launch such projects (Sterling, 2009: 3). Accordingly, barriers 
are expected to increase the edge of defense and thus enhance stability.  
One has to recall however, that this defense-offence idea itself has been subjected 
to lengthy debates between its proponents and opponents. One of the points taken against 
the defense-offence literature is who determines what is offensive and what is defensive 
and how one system could be seen defensive by one state but offensive by another (see 
for example Van Evera, 1984). Additionally, the above view is based their argument on a 
logic based inter-states interaction and cannot be extended to state-non-state relations 
without a deeper exploration. Unlike states, non-states actors seem to be in a constant war 
and if they cannot use their known attack tactics, they have always an incentive to adopt 
new tactics (Horowitz, 2010: 36) no matter whether the defense or the offence has the 
advantage.  
Very few efforts challenged the above arguments. Some countering arguments are 
based on the idea that non-state actors are not static and can adapt to the new 
environment created by the barrier. First, Peter Andreas asserts that barrier do not stop 
infiltrations as infiltrators, including violent ones, may bribe border officials, shift their 
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border-crossing routes and methods, change the nature of their activities and morph their 
organizational structure (2000: 9-15). In addition, the adoption of new military and 
information technologies by infiltrators undermines the usefulness of barriers as security 
tools (Trottier, 2007: 109). This is because the globalization of communication, finance 
and transportation has benefited not only states, but also non-state actors (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni & Jones, 2008: 7). From this perspective, when barriers are built, non-state 
actors can be innovative and find alternative methods to cross the borders or even change 
their tactics to sustain their activities. Second, Geroge Gavrilis draw the attention to the 
fact that barriers may involve land-grabs that would motivate more attacks (2004: 8), a 
matter that would escalate violence when there is an ongoing conflict rather than stop 
attacks or at least reduce their frequency (de Figueiredo & Weingast, 2001: 28; Gavrilis, 
2004: 8; Bock, 2002). 
Thus, the perception of barriers from the defense-offence perspective is overtly 
simplistic, knowing that militants on the other side of a barrier may have technologies 
and innovations to enable them to attack despite a state’s defensive system represented by 
the barrier, an idea posited by Andreas. Additionally, when walls and fences are built on 
a contested or a foreign territory, they may be tactically defensive but strategically 
offensive and could be seen differently by parties involved, also a warning proposed by 
Gavrilis. In other words, understanding barriers’ security outcomes is very context 
specific (Sterling, 2009: 3). In their turn, critics of barriers as security policies, including 
Andreas and Gavrilis, still fall short of providing a thorough analysis of the security 
effects of barriers on non-states’ cross border attacks and of offering detailed empirical 
studies-an omission this paper aims to address. 
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MILITANTS’ NETWORKS AND INSTITUTIONS  
In the terrorism literature, some scholars have explored the militants’ motivations, 
innovations and tactical shifts. To attack, militants need to have the will, the knowledge 
and the material resources. Usually, non-state actors are motivated by a long-term 
fundamental goal, such as ending an occupation, independence and territorial control, as 
well as short-term instrumental and operational goals that pave the way to the long-term 
ones, as in bombings, rocketing and tunneling (Dutter & Seliktar, 2007: 431, Kydd & 
Walter, 2006, Bloom, 2004). Militants see the latter attacks as small steps towards their 
larger goal, and as a result are willing to take extremely high risks and are often willing to 
suffer severe damages (Hewitt, 1984; Poe, 1988, Dutter & Seliktar, 2007: 431). In a 
sense, long-term goals make non-state actors willing to attack to inflict some harm on the 
target state even of this harm is merely psychological and emotional. For the theory 
developed here and building on this literature, having the will to attack is a given for the 
studied non-state actors. In a sense, these militants have at least one persisting 
fundamental goal that is not fulfilled and this in turn motivates them to continue to attack. 
At the resources level, violent non-state actors are known to have limited 
resources, limited capabilities, and limited reach. Thus, for those militants to continue to 
perpetrate attacks against the target state/s, they need resources including weapons, raw 
materials, funding and training. Some scholars have focused on this dimension by 
studying linkages among militant groups. These works established that militant non-state 
actors have networks of relationships through which military capabilities and attack 
tactics get directly diffused among armed groups in different areas. Different militant 
groups send their members to up pick certain attack tactics from their innovators to 
conduct their own attacks (Horowitz, 2010: 34; Desouza & Hensgen, 2007: 598). When 
linkages are present, we expect to see militant groups introducing new attack tactics. 
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As far as tactical shifts are concerned, some argue that deterrent state policies 
limit militants’ resources or affect the relative costliness of different kinds of attacks 
(Enders & Sandler, 2002). When these policies impose restrictions on resources, militants 
look for alternative resources. Put differently, states’ counter-terrorism policies affect the 
cost of certain attacks but militants in turn, may switch to new tactics. In the context of 
the study at hand, barriers impose restrictions on militants’ sources. Nevertheless, 
motivated to attacks still, armed groups will look for alternative methods to access 
needed resources. To get these resources, militants cooperate with recognized, albeit 
criminal, institutions in a way that contribute to their successes (Desouza & Hensgen, 
2007: 593, 598 & 600), and the militants in turn contribute to the further 
institutionalization of these criminal institutions. These institutions provide linkages with 
militant groups abroad through which they access military materials and skills. Without 
the availability of supplies of materials and the know-how needed for the execution of 
attacks under difference circumstances, militants’ attacks may decline after the 
construction of a barrier.  
These institutions begin as smuggling networks that are usually dubbed criminal 
by states and as a result take a clandestine nature. They date back to long time ago in the 
history of border areas particularly whenever a state vigorously carried out law-
enforcement campaigns against illegal trafficking (Andreas & Nadelman, 2006: 4-5). 
When militants use the existing smuggling networks to perpetrate attacks, politics gets 
mixed with economic factors of the existing networks as cooperation become mutually 
beneficial for militants on the one hand and illegal economic entrepreneurs on the other. 
This is because these networks provide militants with needed material and know-how 
resources. In the meanwhile, militants’ use of these networks opens doors for 
economically rewarding exchanges. In these cases, illegal economic and violent webs 
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intertwine (Ibid, 2006: 197). As will be demonstrated below, the cooperation between 
militants and illegal economic entrepreneurs will strengthen the existing illegal networks 
to have them take the shape similar to that of institutions in the legal world. 
Thus, linkages provided through criminal networks that enable militant groups to 
exchange skills and know-how help militants to continue to attack and even introduce 
new attack tactics despite the barrier built by the target state. As a result, militants have 
networks through which they directly learn from other more experienced groups. These 
linkages help militant non-state actors determine what attack tactic they can adopt. 
Exchange of knowledge among militant groups facilitated by militants’ institutions 
introduces new attack tactics by non-state actors. 
CONCLUSION AND HYPOTHESES  
This chapter has examined the ways in which current political science literature 
has explained barriers and their relationship to cross border attacks. It also shed light on 
some ideas developed with in the terrorism literature concerning militants’ motivations to 
attack, militants’ tactics and institutions. Based on these contributions, I establish a 
connection among all of the above literatures in the context of construction of barriers. 
Below are three hypotheses regarding the role of barriers on borders in promoting use and 
even strength of militants’ institutions and violence in general. 
 
Hypothesis 1: barriers on borders can perpetuate and strengthen militants’ supply 
institutions. 
Hypothesis 2: militants’ supply institutions can create conditions that enable militants to 
continue attacking despite the barrier and even increase the frequency of their attacks. 
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Hypothesis 3: barriers on borders may, accompanied by the existence of militants’ supply 
institutions, cause introduction of and shifts to new tactics.  
 This paper demonstrates that in some areas, barriers are built can perpetuate and 
strengthen militants’ supply institutions. This is because once the borders are sealed off, 
motivated militant groups turn for alternative solutions to access military knowledge and 
materials that would enable sustain their attacks and even adopt new attack tactic that 
could be executed despite the barrier. I define militants’ supply institutions as networks 
that establish connections and linkages between militant groups in one area to the 
external world as well as other militants in other countries through which they exchange 
materials and knowledge. Micheal Horowits (2010) has already referred to the 
importance of these inter-group linkages as a key factor to the introduction of new tactics 
by non-state actors. These supply institutions start as smuggling networks that may 
initially exist for criminal and other reasons. When sources are blocked for militants as a 
result of a barrier built by a state, militants resort to these institutions for supplies. These 
institutions help militants to cope, survive and sustain their activities despite difficult 
circumstances (Andreas, 2008: 18). Barriers on borders, nevertheless, do not necessarily 
create these militants’ institutions but they can definitely make the existing ones more 
institutionalized.  
Overtime, with the rise in demand on using these networks, they gain features of 
what is known as institutions in the legal world (see for example Gavrilis, 2008: 1523; 
Tilly, 1990; Anderson, 1996: 1). For instance, these networks may develop to become 
staffed with people, such as service and goods providers as well as consumers embedded 
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in networks of selling, buying, and transferring knowledge and materials. Interaction 
within these networks becomes more regularized by setting specific fees for certain goods 
and services, and providing rules for any exchange. At a more advanced phase, even 
networks owners may have to pay taxes to a higher authority to sustain their business in 
another attempt to regulate the striving interaction.  
Thus this paper posits that, in some cases, building barriers on borders to stop 
militants’ attacks may escalate conflict. However, two main conditions account for this 
negative effect. First, though not sufficient in of itself, militants must have the will to 
attack the target state. It has been established in the literature that non-state actors are 
usually motivated by a long-term fundamental goal, as well as short-term instrumental 
and operational goals that pave the way to the long-term ones, as in bombings, rocketing 
and tunneling (Dutter & Seliktar, 2007: 431, Kydd & Walter, 2006, Bloom, 2004). The 
persistence of their long-term goal keeps non-state actors’ continuously motivated to 
attack despite all obstacles and deterrence policies even if they are not necessarily 
gaining much from one specific attack. The mere psychological and emotional harm an 
attack may cause may be considered a success in of itself even if it does not cause any 
physical damage.  
Nevertheless, a second condition is necessary to continue to perpetrate attacks and 
to determine what attacks tactic could be adopted; militants need resources to be able to 
implement attacks against their target state. They need weapons, raw materials, funding 
and training, which could be provided through their supply institutions (Desouza & 
Hensgen, 2007: 598 & 600). These institutions provide linkages with external sources 
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and other militant groups to share materials and skills. Without supplies of materials and 
the know-how needed for the execution of attacks under difference circumstances, 
militants’ attacks may decline.  
Thus this paper does not deny the fact that barriers as a deterrent state policy, 
some label them as anti-terrorism policies do affect non-state actors’ attacks. However, 
this effect neither is necessarily direct and nor leading to the stopping the threat and 
attacks. Yet, when militants have the will and resources to attack, the effect of barriers on 
non-state cross-border attacks usually falls under changes in the nature of these attacks 
but not necessarily the number. Each deterrent policy can influence a non-state actor’s 
choice of operations by either affecting their resources or the relative costliness of 
different kinds of attacks (Enders & Sandler, 2002). Militants adopt certain tactics not 
others depending on what materials and skills they have and what tactics can survive the 
new reality created by the barrier. Once institutions and networks are available to fulfill 
this purpose, militants resort to these networks to continue their attacks and will be able 
to shift to new tactics if old ones are not successful anymore. Cooperation among militant 
groups and the recognized illegal institutions contribute to the former’s ability to attack 
(Desouza & Hensgen, 2007: 593). 
Like many other state counter-terrorism policies, the problem with barriers is that 
they address specific attacks but ignore the will that drives those attacks. When militants 
with a drive to attack find themselves fenced off and unable to sustain the attacks known 
to them due to the obstacles created by the barrier, they try to use their supply institutions 
in search for new tactics, new raw materials and knew knowledge. If militants manage to 
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find such supplies, the end result under these conditions is the continuation of attacks 
despite the barrier. Furthermore, if militants get access to new military skills and 
materials through, they may introduce attack tactics they never used before. In both cases, 
rather than decrease in attacks, militants may even intensify their attacks. 
To summarize, barriers do not stop attacks; rather motivated resourceful militants 
may increase their attacks after the construction of the barrier. However, the barrier may 
cause militants to introduce new tactics and shift to certain attacks tactics. Militants 
motivated to attack will look for new resources once they are fenced off. If those 
militants find supply institutions, these institutions get more institutionalized when 
militants start using them. Once militants find these supply institutions, they will manage 
to shift to new tactics that are possible to implement despite the barrier. They will be 
even able to increase the frequency of their attacks with the abundance of resources. 
The three hypotheses developed above will be tested in the next chapter by 
examining the ways in which the Israeli Gaza barrier has caused an increase in the 
number of militant attacks and led the militants to shift to new tactics. If also explores 








Chapter 2: Evidence and Analysis 
The Gaza case illustrates the mechanism through which building barriers on 
borders can lead to an increase in attacks. After offering a brief review of Gaza’s relevant 
history, I describe how the Israeli Gaza barrier perpetuated and indirectly strengthened 
militants’ supply institutions. I then show how these institutions triggered mechanisms to 
perpetuate the conflict with Israel by escalation of violence through increasing the 
number of attacks and providing supplies for new attack tactics.  
To demonstrate how the Gaza barrier has affected the militants’ attacks by 
introduction of new tactics and shifting to certain attack tactics, I supplement the 
empirical evidence with descriptive statistics on both Gaza attacks and changes in 
relevant dimensions of the barrier between 1990 and 2010. These descriptives also 
disintegrate the Israeli Gaza barrier into several dimensions and tries to establish 
correlations between each of these dimensions and the Gaza attacks. They are based on a 
dataset I have created in 2010-11 covering all Gaza attack tactics and all physical 
dimensions of the Israeli barrier around the area. 3 
BACKGROUND  
In 1993 Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles, indicating a new 
era after thirty-six years of direct Israeli military occupation of the Gaza Strip. Internal 
administrative issues were transferred for the Palestinian Authority headed by the late 
                                                
3 Attacks data include the number of suicide bombings, rocket attacks, tunnel attacks and roadside and 
settlement attacks collected from world newspapers available on LexisNexis (English), militant groups 
websites (Arabic), and Israeli Foreign ministry website (English). Barrier dimensions data are collected 
from international newspapers available on LexisNexis, OCHA website and Applied Research Institute-
Jerusalem. Barrier dimensions are length, continuity, material, location, buffer zone, distance from the 
Green Line, Palestinian Land taken to build the barrier and buffer zones in sq. km, number of surveillance 
and weapons technologies reported to be used on the barrier, 24/7 and mobile policing, number of 
checkpoints and barriers to movement inside Gaza and number of Israeli settlements and Palestinian land 
under settlement control. 
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Yasser Arafat (Efrat, 2006: 42). By mid-1995 Israel withdrew its forces from the Gaza 
Strip and took locations on its borders. It generally maintained control the borders and 
coordinated crossings with the newly established Palestinian security apparatus. About a 
year before signing the agreement, Israel deported members of military groups to 
Southern Lebanon. In the midst of their exile, Southern Lebanese and particularly the 
well-known Hezbollah who operated form the area welcomed those deported. Many 
terrorism scholars trace the beginnings of linkages between Palestinian armed groups, 
particularly Hamas, and Hezbollah to that time (Horowitz, 2010: 37). 
The effect of the establishment of the Hamas-Hezbollah link could be seen in the 
Israeli streets. In 1993, as the peace process was being discussed between the Israeli and 
Palestinian representatives, militants, particularly PIJ and Hamas, launched their first 
suicide bombing originating from the Gaza Strip. Some works in the literature see this 
attack as well as other attacks by the same militant groups as objections to the peace 
process and an attempt to spoil the agreement (see Kydd & Walter, 2002). Others like 
Pape argued that foreign occupation and religious differences between the terrorist group 
and the perceived occupying state drive suicide bombing (Pape, 2005). In parallel to 
those suicide attacks, Gazans also carried out settlement and roadside attacks against 
Israelis. Nevertheless, the latter attacks attracted much less attention and media coverage. 
No matter what those attacks and no matter what really motivated them, Israel was 
convinced that something has to be done to stop them. 
MOTIVATIONS AND TACTICS OF GAZA MILITANTS  
Gaza militants including the armed wings of Hamas, Fatah, the Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular 
Resistance Committees (PRC), believe that they have a larger goal of self-determination, 
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independence and ending the Israeli occupation. These groups’ militants and political 
leaders recurrently and consistently articulated this goal (see of example, Hamas, 2007). 
Moreover, the former Hamas spokesperson, Abdel Aziz Rantisi recurrently stressed that, 
“There can be no talk of stopping martyrdom operations as long as we continue to be 
under Israeli occupation and aggression (Potter, 2002: A13) while Fatah’s Al Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigades indicated that it would suspend its attacks against Israel under the 
condition that the latter quit all occupied territories (Ibid: A13). Thus, to these militants, 
attacking in the form of suicide-terrorism, rocketing, tunnel operations and settlement and 
roadside attacks are merely steps serving their fundamental goal of ending the Israeli 
occupation.   
The persistence of this key goal always gave them the motivation to attack Israel 
but they have to make a choice about what they can do in order to achieve this goal based 
on the resources and skills they have. The Palestinian militants in Gaza see the 
development of their attacks tactics as well as introducing new ones a natural 
development as they are at conflict and are attempting defend themselves. In addition, 
they see development of their attack tactics in the context of “the need is the mother of 
inventions.” Hamas for example, contends that after having Israeli tightly closing the 
Gaza strip particularly after the outbreak of the Aqsa Intifada in late 2000, militants lost 
many of their military raw materials and arsenals. As a result, they resorted to alternative 
methods to fight. Rantisi said in this context, “we are in a struggle against a superior 
enemy, with its advanced military technology. Consequently, we try to develop our 
weapons to be able to encounter this enemy as much as we could” (The Qualitative 
Development, 2003). In 2006, Muhammad Dayf, the then Commander in chief of Hamas’ 
military wing in Gaza emphasized the same idea when he described Gaza militant 
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operations as advancing from bombings, suicide bombings to finally reach tunneling, 
which he considers a qualitative development (Al-Jazeera Airs, 2006). 
In the first intifada, militants attacked by throwing stones, then by ambushing 
Israeli forces, then by suicide bombing, then by launching rockets and finally by tunnel-
operations. Rockets at the beginning targeted Israeli settlements inside the Gaza Strip, 
then Israeli towns outside of Gaza. Rockets themselves then witnessed technical 
improvement in range and accuracy. The Hamas website posits that every time Israel 
tightens its grip by intensifying its punishment policies and policing strategies, its fighters 
consistently look for alternatives to continue attacking. Rocket attacks, Hamas admits, 
were an innovation that caused by the Israeli tight fence around the strip. Additionally, 
with the Israeli fence and closure, Hamas and other militant groups resorted to smuggling 
weapons and military materials through the tunnels under the borders with Egypt (The 
Qualitative Development, 2003).  
In other words, the will to attack also motivates militants to develop their own 
attack tactics based on their available resources. This will has been always persistent for 
the Gaza militants and as result the first condition to attack is present in the case at hand. 
THE GAZA ATTACKS VS. THE ISRAELI BARRIER  
In response to a wave of suicide bombings, as well as roadside attacks in early 
1990s by Hamas and PIJ, Israel launched a fence project along its perceived borders with 
Gaza (Bronner, 1995: 1). The Israeli fence completely encircled the area, had a 300m 
buffer zone and used surveillance cameras and touch sensors and electric wires. 
Generally, the number of Gaza attacks went down from 1995-2000 after the construction 
of the barrier. About five years after the construction of the fence, the Palestinian Aqsa 
Intifada broke out in late 2000 and Israel was showered with waves of attacks including 
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suicide bombings and settlement and roadside attacks from Gaza in addition to new 
tactics illustrated by rockets, tunnel operations. This time, these attacks were launched 
not only by Hamas and PIJ, but also by Fatah, PRC and PFLP. In 2005, Israel further 
intensified its barrier technologies, extended its buffer zone and ended any Israeli 
existence inside the Gaza Strip. Right after, we see a continuation of attacks from Gaza 
but this time with a tactical shift to mostly rocket attacks (for details on attacks, see figure 
1 below).  
Figure 1: Attack Tactics vs. the Barrier. 
In early 2000s, Israel extended the buffer zone to 1km and added new 
technologies including continuous videotaping and 24/7 surveillance equipments. In the 
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the number of roadblocks and checkpoints within the territory to control movement even 
more. Militants at this point in time found themselves in a rising conflict with Israel but 
the Israeli barrier this time imposed many obstacles on accessing military resources. 
Motivated by their persisting will to attack, and seeing an opportunity in using the 
smuggling tunnels to get military materials and training, they started to intensively use 
these networks to import needed military materials and skills. 
With the flowing supplies from the tunnels mixed with their own past experience 
in settlement and roadside attacks as well as suicide bombings, Gaza militants continued 
to attacks Israel and introduced tactics they never used before; rockets and tunnel attacks 
borrowed from Hezbollah (Rabinovich, 2007: A13).  
Late 2005, Israel had unilaterally withdrawn from the strip and intensified its 
barrier policing by even adding more technologies, such as aerial surveillance, ground 
sensors, and distantly controlled weapons. It also expanded the buffer zone between 2 
and 9km. After this development, we rarely see any suicide bombings emanating from 
Gaza and most of the attack from the area are rocket attacks. This was explained by both 
militants and experts as being a result of increasing difficulties to cross the borders to 
carry suicide attacks inside Israel and the evacuation of Israeli settlements inside the 
Strip, which decreased the Israeli targets accessible to militants (Qassim, 2009). 
Before moving to the quantitative data, it is important to establish the link that 
provided Gaza militants with military resources and thus they could attack Israel despite 
the barrier, introduce new tactics and later shift to certain attack tactics. This link is 
presented in the Gaza tunnels. 
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GAZA TUNNELS 
Gaza tunnels are traced back to 1982 when Israel fortified its frontier after peace 
with Egypt. They appeared when the Israeli-Egyptian borders separated relatives from 
Rafah as families started digging at the closest points on both sides (Smith, 2006: 1). 
Over time, the tunnels that were motivated by reconnecting families were used to 
smuggle people and illegal commodities. Profit became a factor that enhanced the 
sustainability of the tunnels as Gaza underground traffic prospered but mainly maintained 
an economic nature.  
Over time, as Israeli tightened its closures and control over its borders with Gaza; 
these tunnels became the Gaza lifeline and the militants’ main source for weapons and 
military materials. In the next few paragraphs, I detail the steps through which the Gaza 
barrier has contributed to strengthening militants’ networks and how that in turned caused 
the continuation, increase and innovations in Gaza attacks. 
Evolution of Tunnels into Institutions  
The Gaza tunnels went through three developmental phases proceeding towards 
institutionalization. As mentioned above, from the outset, these tunnels were first built 
for social reasons with separated families breaching the borders in order to reconnect 
with relatives on the other side. The digging started at the closest points on both sides of 
the borders usually by prominent Rafah clans, such as the Al Sha'ir, Breaka and Zorob 
families (Toolis, 2007: 18). Immediately, these families realized the economic revenues 
they could garner by smuggling goods back and forth into their tunnels and this is when 
people, and commodities, such as hash, cigarettes and cars-spare parts were carried back 
and forth in Gaza’s tunnels in the 1980s. Weapons were indeed among the smuggled 
materials particularly during conflict escalations, such as in the first Palestinian Intifada 
in the late 1980s, but arms smuggling was never very active until early 2000s (Ibid: 18). 
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The second phase started in late 2000 with the outbreak of the Aqsa Intifada. In 
this phase, tunnels took a more political form when they have become the main source of 
weapons, military raw materials and training needed by the Gaza militant groups to 
launch attacks. As mentioned above, Israel increased the technologies it used on its Gaza 
barrier, extended its buffer zone, upped the number of deployed personnel and thus 
crossing into Israel became more difficult for Gaza militants. With a persisting will to 
attack Israel and with the increasingly rising tension, militants headed to the southern 
borders of Gaza with an already active illegal trafficking.  
Through those tunnels, and relaying on relations that were already established 
directly with Hezbollah in early 1990s and indirectly with Iran, tunnels not only offered 
those militants access to military materials, they also transported Gaza militants outside 
of Gaza to get military training and got military trainers from abroad into Gaza (Israeli 
Army notes Shifts, 2003). In the chart presented above, the effect of tunnels on Gaza 
tactics is evident in the introduction of new attacks tactics, such as tunnel operations and 
rocketing, which were tactics borrowed from Hezbollah in early 2000s (Abdel Hameed, 
2009; Gedalyahu, 2010; Qassim, 2009; Israel Says Iran, 2004; The Qualitative, 2003). 
Since 2000, rocket parts for instance, were regularly taken through the tunnels and 
assembled inside Gaza by munitions experts (Mazzetti, 2009: 12). A rocket-maker in 
Gaza says that he gets the needed materials through the tunnels to make his rockets to 
sells them to different militant groups, such as PIJ and PFLP. He adds that each rocket 
costs the militant groups $300 and that he makes at least a couple a month (Murphy, 
2008: 6). After getting the needed training from Hezbollah, tunnels were also used to 
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attack Israeli military bases just outside of the borders with the Gaza Strip. Although 
these operations are few in number, they are very unique in nature because they require 
extensive preparations and planning. Preparations for instance include collecting 
intelligence about the target, digging the tunnels and planning for implementation. 
Furthermore, in almost all tunnel operations militants used other tactics in the same 
operation, i.e. suicide bombing and rocketing, which increased the efficiency of these 
attacks and distracted the Israelis soldiers. In most of those operations, more than one 
militants groups was involved in the execution.  
From the perspective of the smugglers, they had high economic incentives to 
transport weapons in their tunnel networks despite the high risks of being arrested or even 
killed. For instance, a Kalashnikov that cost $500 in Egypt would cost as much as $2,500 
in the Gaza Strip. Consequently, tunnel digging became a very lucrative business in the 
border areas and the profits were usually divided among partners; tunnel owners, builders, 
gatekeepers and smugglers. Tunnel gangs started to charge premiums of up to %150 on 
their cargoes. From the perspective the average people, tunnels provide employment for 
20,000 construction workers who previously worked inside Israel in the past (Toolis, 2007: 
18; Bongiorni, 2007; Chulov, 2008: 14; Jansenfinds, 2008: 12; Martin, 2008: 41; Freeman, 
2009: 32). Many today work as diggers, drivers and haulers (Lifeline, 2009).  
The third phase started in late 2005 as Israel evacuated its settlements, added new 
technologies on its Gaza barrier and extended its buffer zone. After that, an increase in the 
numbers of weapons smuggled into Gaza through the tunnels has been noted including 
imported Katyusha rockets, AK47s, better known as Kalashnikov, RPG rockets, 
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explosives, and ammunitions (Martin, 2008: 41; Bongiorni, 2007; Mazzetti, 2009: 12). 
Moreover, the number of tunnels mushroomed and became longer, more developed and 
better equipped compared to older one.  
Institutionalization of Gaza tunnels reached its peak at this phase after the Hamas 
take over Gaza in Mid-2007 as the owners of hundreds of tunnels under the Gaza-Egypt 
border registered with the Hamas authorities, signed pledges to pay tunnel workers' 
compensation and hooked up the tunnels to the local electricity network (Lamb, 2008: 70). 
Hamas also started imposing taxes on the underground flows, and provided protection for 
the diggers and tunnel businesses in general (Witte, 2008: A01). The exchange has also 
become more regularized with set prices. For example, having a person smuggled across 
costs about $1,250, a sack of items about $250, about $23 for a Kalashnikov, 18 cents a 
bullet, and about $10 for a pack of cigarettes. This in when the incentive for sustaining the 
tunnels networks was a combination of politics and profit (Toolis, 2007: 18; Smith, 2006: 
1; Martin, 2008: 41). Tunnel organization at this phase can be also illustrated in having 
some specialized in transporting certain commodities; for instance, in 2008, ten tunnels 
have thick hosepipes to carry diesel, which is collected in large plastic vats and distributed 
to clients (Jansenfinds, 2008: 12).  
To summarize, Gaza’s tunnels evolved from being merely illegal smuggling 
networks to fully-fledged institutions. At the beginning these tunnels were used for social 
and economic reasons to develop into military use as a result of lack of resources. With the 
intense involvement of militants in tunnel activities, these networks developed over the 
past years to become institutions supplying goods and services and offering job 
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opportunities. They also were protected by militants and were supplied with services like 
electricity in exchange for paying taxes to the militants in charge. 
THE QUANTITATIVE DATA  
Below I detail the effect of the barrier on Gaza attacks. The charts cover changes 
in both variables over time. Unfortunately, it is impossible to quantitatively represent the 
Gaza tunnels in these charts due to lack on information and ambiguity of the topic. 
However the qualitative data provided in the previous section should fill in this gap. The 
quantitative data presented here has two main goals. First, it demonstrates whether the 
Israeli barrier has affected the frequency and type of attacks from Gaza. Second, it shows 
what specific dimensions of the barrier had an effect on number of attacks as well as 
attack tactics. example: 
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Having a general look at the development of Gaza attacks over time after the 
construction of the Israeli barrier reveals a counter-intuitive picture for those who support 
the idea of barriers being successful deterrent strategies. The chart above indicates that 
after the construction of the barrier (mid-1995), attacks went down to almost zero 
between 1995 and late 2000. Yet late 2000, with the outbreak of the Aqsa Intifada, the 
attacks started increasing to peak up in the second half of 2004. They then declined in 
mid-2000s. In the second half of 2000s, attacks have three major spikes in late 2006, late 
2007 and late 2008-early 2009. Attacks sunk into three big declines after each attack 
peak. Knowing that the Gaza barrier was always there during this period of time, this 
means that there are other variables affecting the frequency of Gaza attacks other than the 
mere construction of the barrier. It would be interesting to see what was going during 
these four peaks. 
Exploring qualitatively what was going on during this fluctuation of attacks 
reveals that at all four points in time, there was a major Israeli military operation 
launched in the Strip. In 2004, Israel carried out several ground operations but mainly in 
Rafah, where many Palestinian houses were leveled to track cross-border tunnels (Israeli 
Army Completes, 2004). Also later in the same year, Israel launched a series of ground 
operations in the north of the strip to fight rockets (110 Palestinians, 2004: 22). In second 
half of 2006, Israel launched one of its biggest military operations in Gaza after militants 
kidnapped an Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit in later 2006 (Israel Steps up, 2006: 23). In late 
2007, Israel executes a big incursion into the Gaza Strip accompanied by tank and air-
born attacks (Fisher, 2007: A22).  
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As for the declines, late 2005 had witnessed the Israeli unilateral disengagement 
and evacuation of settlements in the Gaza Strip (Israel completes Gaza, 2005). Hamas 
and other militants describe this Israeli move as a victory. For example, Fawzi Barhoum, 
a Hamas spokesman said in the context of the disengagement, “This is the victory of 
Hamas against the occupation" (Bengali, 2009). In mid-2008, Israel offered a cease-fire 
deal between Israel and Hamas (Katz & Keinon, 2008: 1). By end of June, both Israel and 
the Gaza militants, particularly Hamas, started a six-months truce (Walker, 2008). Right 
after the Israeli operation “Cast Lead” both Israel and Hamas announced a cease-fire that 
may explain the decline in attacks after January 2009. Later in the same year, Hamas 
announced that it informed the Palestinian factions with military wings that it will “deal 
with the individual acts” of firing rockets at Israel but it will turn a blind eye to any 
resistance action against Israeli forces if they enter Gaza (Sabbah, 2009). 
Knowing that the Gaza attacks employed several tactics; it would be interesting to 
disintegrate attack tactics to see if the construction of the barrier is correlated with 
introduction of new tactics and/or any tactical shifts. Gaza attacks fall under four main 
categories, Suicide bombings, settlements and roadside attacks, rockets and tunnel 
operations. The chart below indicates that the construction of the barrier also falls behind 
explaining the dynamics of the Gaza attacks. In the early 1990s and before the 
construction of the barrier, Gaza militants employed suicide bombing and settlement and 
roadside attacks. In the second half of the 1990s, and after the construction of the barrier, 
militants continued to use the same tactics. From 2001-2005, militants combined their old 
tactics with new ones to intensively use of four tactics: suicide bombings, tunnel attacks, 
rocket attacks and settlement and roadside attacks. More than ten years after building the 
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Gaza barriers, militants shifted to mostly launching rocket attacks. This means neither 
introduction of new attacks tactics (tunnels and rocket attacks) in early 2000s nor the 
tactical shift in Gaza attacks after 2005 cannot be explained by the mere construction of 
the Gaza barrier. example: 
Figure 3: Attack Tactics vs. the Barrier. 
Thus, the data illustrated in the two charts above show that the barriers stop 
attacks argument has no empirical support from the Gaza case. On the contrary, this case 
demonstrates a fluctuation in the number of attacks after the construction of the barrier 
that is better explained by Israeli military operations and truces. Additionally, the 
relatively long time lag between the construction of the barrier on the one hand and the 
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there must something else other than building the barrier that can explain the nature of 
militants attacks. Nevertheless, one has to keep in mind as detailed in the previous 
section, when militants introduced new tactics was the same time they started using 
tunnel networks for military reasons and this may account for the introduction of these 
tactics. 
Specific Barrier Dimensions vs. Attacks  
Technology vs. Attacks  
Knowing that the Israeli Gaza barrier has changed over time, it would be 
interesting to look deeper into the barrier dimensions that varied to see if these variations 
can account for the increase and decrease in the number of attacks, introduction of new 
tactics and/or tactical shifts in attacks. This is because there might be certain dimensions 
of the barrier that have caused any of the dynamic changes in Gaza attacks. From the 
dataset I created, I select here the barrier dimensions that vary over time because 
constants cannot explain a variable; frequency of Gaza attacks and attack tactical shifts. 
The constant dimensions of the barrier include: height of the barrier (mostly 3 meters), 
material (mostly a fence), continuity (completely encircling Gaza), thickness (specific 
attacker chased and punished deep inside Gaza and/or Israe), length (62.7km), location 
(on the Green Line), and distance from the Green Line (0). On the other hand, number of 
smart surveillance and military technologies used on the barrier, number of settlements, 
number of checkpoints, Palestinian land attached to the barrier in square km, the deepest 
point buffer zone went into the Palestinian areas in meters-km, Palestinian land under 
settlements jurisdictions, 24/7 and mobile policing are dimensions that have varied over 
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time and may thus affect the rise and decline in the frequency of the Gaza attacks and/or 
the tactical shifts.  
Figure 4: Attack Frequency vs. Barrier Technology. 
The above chart presents the relationship between the frequencies of Gaza attacks 
and number of smart technologies used on the barrier by Israel. It reveals that the two 
times Israel increased its technologies were followed by first, a short decline in the 
number of attacks and then, a gradual increase in attacks. This is an indication that barrier 
technologies do affect the number attacks however, as militants adapt to these new 
technologies, they can increase the number of attacks afterwards. However, examining 
other points in time when attacks decrease indicates that technologies cannot explain the 






























































































































































































when first employed technologies may initially affect the number of attacks, we cannot 
claim that technologies are the cause behind all declines in attacks. To look at a different 
level of the interaction, it would be interesting to examine if technology has an effect on 
the nature of attacks.  
Figure 5: Attack Tactics vs. Barrier Technologies. 
Having a quick look at the chart above reveals that increase in barrier technology 
has variant effects on in attack tactics. The first addition to the technologies came around 
mid-2001 with continuous videotaping and day & night observation posts equipped with 
technologies that cover a range of 6km. Rockets were introduced before increasing the 
technologies. Nevertheless, these technologies were immediately followed by the 
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are not responsible for the introduction of rockets as a tactic but can explain employing 
tunnel operations.  
From the same chart, we can tell that a tactical shift happened in the end of 2005, 
just after Israel added more technologies on its barrier. This tactical shift is presented in 
having rockets the main attack tactic. Israel added automated and remotely-controlled 
machine guns, ground sensors, and drones, and rocket radars. After this addition, we 
rarely see suicide attacks, which were one of the main tactics used before 2005. This 
could be because with the new technologies, it has become very difficult to have militants 
go to Israeli locations without being detected and punished. Thus, from the evidence 
provided above, technologies may cause the introduction of new tactics as well as the 
shift to certain tactics. 
Barrier Land and Attacks  
Barrier land related dimensions are also interesting to look at. They are three, 
first, Palestinian land taken by Israel and attached to the barrier system in square km. It is 
usually land taken from Gazans to become part of the buffer zone. The second land 
dimension is the deepest point the buffer zone goes into Gaza. Finally, we have the 
Palestinian land under settlement use and jurisdiction. 
As for the frequency of attacks vis-à-vis expansion of settlements (see chart 
below), attacks were already increasing before Israel expanded its settlement land. Yet, as 
the settlement expanded in mid-2002, we see the increase in attack becomes sharper 
towards the end of 2002 and the first half of 2003. Thus, expansion of settlements 
accelerated the increase in the number of attacks. Later, when Israel gave up all the 
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settlements land in 2005, we see a sharp declined in the Gaza attacks. So, settlement land 
may provide an explanation in the increase and decrease in the frequency of attacks.  
Figure 6: Attack Frequency vs. Barrier Land. 
As for the Palestinian land taken by Israel to become part of its barrier system, the 
first increase in this land around mid-2001 was immediately followed by a slight increase 
in the number of Gaza attacks. What is more interesting is the post 2005 phase as the 
increase in Gaza attacks consistently followed increase in the Palestinian land taken for 
the barrier. This happens twice in late 2005 and early 2007. Consequently, we can say the 
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Finally, concerning the deepest point the buffer zone went into the Palestinian 
areas, the first increase came in 2001 during which attacks were through a minor decline. 
We cannot say this decline resulted from the buffer zone as both appear to happen at the 
same time. Nevertheless, after Israeli widened its barrier buffer zone around mid-2001, 
the number of attacks increased. The second extension of the buffer zone is in late 2004. 
At this point, attacks were already increasing and continued to increase after the 
expansion of the buffer zone. Thus, the deepest point of the buffer zone does not seem to 
consistently explain the increase and decrease in attacks.  
So, in general land variables are relevant to the frequency of Gaza attacks. The 
more land Palestinians lose, the higher the number of attacks and when Israel gave 
Palestinians land back, attacks declined. Settlement expansion and increase of barrier 
land however, better explain the frequency of attacks than the deepest point the buffer 
zone goes. 
Barrier Policing Dimensions vs. Attacks  
As for the effect of policing on the number of attacks, illustrated in the chart 
below, the addition of 24/7 and mobile policing in mid-2001 was followed by a gradual 
rise in attacks but it is unclear if they are actually the cause of this increase. This is 
because later, the number of attacks rose and declined without any noted changes in 
policing the barrier.  
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Figure 7: Attack Frequency vs. 24/7 & Mobile Policing. 
When examining the effect of policing dimensions on attack tactics, presented in 
the chart below, we find that right after these the addition of 24/7 and mobile policing on 
the Gaza barrier, Gazan militants introduced tunnel attacks. Tactical shift to rockets 
occurred after 2005 but not necessarily due to having mobile and 24/7 policing because 
no changes happened on the latter. Thus, we can say, policing dimension may cause the 
introduction of new tactics but not necessarily the shift to specific ones. Thus, barrier-
policing dimensions may cause the introduction of new tactics but does not affect the 
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Figure 8: Attack Tactics vs. 24/7 & Mobile Policing. 
Internal Control Dimensions vs. Attacks  
Regarding the effect of checkpoints, roadblocks and other barriers to movement 
inside Gaza the chart below indicates that the increase in the number of checkpoints 
between 2001 and 2005 was accompanied by an increase in the Gaza attacks. Yet, a 
closer look at the chart reveals the following: every increase in the number of Israeli 
checkpoints in the Gaza strip in the early 2000s was followed by an increase in the 
number of Gaza attacks. However, the picture is flipped in mid-2004 as the number of 
attacks peaked before Israel increased its roadblocks, checkpoints and other internal 
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increase in the number of Israeli checkpoints inside the strip. Nevertheless, the sudden 
dismantlement of Israeli checkpoints in the context of the Israeli Gaza disengagement in 
late 2005 was immediately followed by a decline in Gaza attacks. Thus, the number of 
checkpoints does seem to have an effect on the number of Gaza attacks.  
Figure 9: Attack Frequency vs. Checkpoints & Roadblocks. 
Concerning the effect of checkpoints on tactical shifts, disappearance of 
checkpoints inside Gaza was followed by a shift from a combination of suicide 
bombings, rockets, tunnel attacks and roadside and settlement attacks to mostly rocket 
attacks. It is also worth noting that increase in the number of checkpoints was associated 
with an increase in settlement and roadside attacks between 2001 and 2005. Between 
2001 and 2003, every increase in the number of checkpoints was associated with an 
























































































































































































happened at the same time until late 2003 when we see increase in rocket attacks 
preceding the increase in checkpoints. Thus, rocket attacks may be the cause behind the 
increase in checkpoints at least during that time.  
Figure 10: Attack tactics vs. checkpoints & Roadblocks. 
From the above data, we can generally conclude that the construction of the 
barrier in 1994 did not stop attacks. Early 2000s seem to be a turning point since attacks 
in general increased. Looking the beyond the images provided by those charts, 2000 is 
indeed the time the Aqsa intifada started but it is also the time tunnels started to be 
intensively used by militants as well. Right after the beginning of the Intifada, new 
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materials needed for those tactics were lacking for the Gaza militants until they employed 
the tunnels to import rockets, military raw materials and skills.  
Additionally, some dimensions of the barrier seem to be potential causes for 
increase and decrease in attacks as well as shifts to new tactics. Barrier technologies, 
especially automated & remote-controlled machine guns, ground sensors, and drones 
could be behind shift to rocket attacks after 2005. However, the land related dimensions 
seem to offer a strong potential causal variable. Expansion of land taken from the 
Palestinians is associated with increase in attacks and vice-versa. Finally 24/7 and mobile 
policing could be the cause behind introducing tunnel attacks.  
However, neither the continuity of attacks nor shifts to new tactics would have 
been possible without the availability of supplies. Without the Gaza militants’ tunnels 















Chapter 3: Conclusions and Future Research  
With barriers becoming a common phenomenon in our contemporary world due 
to the threat imposed by non-state actors, studying the attacks by Gaza militants 
described above, reveals that the mere construction of the barrier can explain nothing 
about the frequency of attacks, the introduction of new tactics or tactical shifts. Although 
the Gaza barrier completely encircled the Gaza Strip since the day of its construction, 
attacks generally continued. This proves that the argument that barriers fail to deter 
attacks by denial or even by punishment. At least, it is safe to say that barriers are context 
specific. 
This paper offered a new theory and explored an empirical study of the effect of 
one of the most intensively policed barrier’s effect on militants’ attacks. In this chapter, I 
briefly review the theoretical claims and the evidence presented in the above chapters. 
Then, I address some of the implications of these findings in Gaza as well as in other 
cases of barriers. 
SUMMARY: ARGUMENT AND EVIDENCE  
The paper is motivated by the spreading phenomenon of building barriers in 
borders by many states in our world today. The main argument adopted by both 
politicians who build these barriers as well as many political scientists is that barriers will 
facilitate defense and this will keep their proper safe and secure. My hypotheses attempt 
to explain the outcomes of physical barriers on borders and challenge this common 
perception about barriers. To do so, I relied on some arguments that countered the above 
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detailed common wisdom about barriers and borrowed from the existing literature on 
violent groups’ motivations, tactical shift, cooperation with criminal networks and 
institutions. In the first hypothesis I expect barriers to cause already existing criminal 
networks to develop into militant institutions. In other words, one of the unintended 
consequences of the Gaza barrier is the fact that it pushed militants to develop tunnels-
networks into institutions. As provided in the second and third hypotheses, these 
networks/institutions provide militants with military materials and skills that help them to 
continue to attack and even increase the number of their attacks despite the barrier. At 
another level, these supply institutions also provide militants with necessary resources to 
introduce and shift to new tactics.  
My examination of the Gaza case from early 1990s through 2010 supports the 
idea that militants’ institutions were key in playing an intermediary role in the interaction 
between the Gaza militants attacks and Israeli border policing tactics on Gaza barriers. It 
also indicates that one cannot generalize about the outcomes of barriers. However, the 
study of the Gaza case here also reveals that some aspects of the Gaza barrier did indeed 
have an effect on militant’s number of attacks, introduction of new tactics and tactical 
shifts. From the quantitative evidence provided, certain dimensions of the barrier forced 
the Gaza militants to explore what resources their institutions can provide and based on 
that either somehow continue to use the same old tactics if the barrier allows them to do 
so, introduce tactics of new nature or switch tactics. Thus, in a sense, these dimensions of 
the barrier affect when the tactical shifts happen. But supplies provided by the militants’ 
institutions define what tactics militants can use/introduce given the restrictions imposed 
by the barrier. 
While the construction of the barrier cannot explain the frequency of attacks, 
introduction of new tactics or tactical shifts, some dimensions of the barrier that varied 
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over time have indeed affected the Gaza attacks tactics. First, barrier technology initially 
causes a decrease in the number of attacks. However, this effect diminishes with time as 
militants adapt to the new technologies. Technologies also are behind the introduction of 
certain tactics as well as tactical shifts. As for the land variables, the more land 
Palestinians lose, especially settlement and barrier lands, the higher the number of attacks 
and vice versa. In turn, the nature of barrier policing may cause the introduction of new 
tactics but does not affect the number of attacks. The internal control variables illustrated 
in the number of checkpoints and other barriers to movement give mixed evidence on its 
relationship. Sometimes the increase in the number of checkpoints was followed by an 
increase in the number of attacks but in some others the rise in the number of attacks 
could be the reason behind the increased number of checkpoints. However, dismantling 
checkpoints in Gaza could be one of the reasons behind militant’s shift to rockets. Thus 
the land variable is the only barrier-dimension that directly affects the number of attacks. 
All other dimensions usually affect attack tactics or give unclear or a diminishing effect 
on the frequency of attacks. 
The latter findings further support the idea that security outcomes of barriers are 
context specific. The qualitative section of this paper dealing with Gaza tunnels indicates 
that Gaza militants continued to attack because they have a persisting will and constant 
supplies of materials and skills. In other contexts probably barriers would cause a stop in 
attacks all together if these barriers provide solutions to the concerned militants’ 
motivations or if those militants are not resourceful enough. At the level of the barrier 
itself, the quantitative evidence provided in this paper indicates that it is a fallacy to claim 
that barriers (fail to) achieve security. Even one barrier may vary along different 
dimensions over time and some of those dimensions affect attacks, others don’t. 
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GAZA IN CONTEXT  
Due to problems with generalizing from this single case study, a carefully 
designed study that compares the Gaza case with other cases, past or present, is needed to 
confirm the conclusions presented here. However, the link I try to withdraw between the 
Gaza barrier, the tunnels networks and attacks does help in understanding the increased 
intensity of attacks from the area as well as the shift to new tactics. It also reveals that 
certain aspects of the barrier may have an effect on the particularly on the nature of 
attacks. 
Thus, to get a fuller picture about the relationship between barriers and their 
specific dimensions and militants attacks as well as the effect of non-state actors 
institutions. Cases of barriers can be compared in different contexts in the Middle East 
and around the world. Comparisons can be conducted with cases where barriers were 
built in the context of illegal immigration and drug trafficking as well. These 
comparisons may offer a more general understanding of barriers and their effect on non-
state actors institutions as well as the frequency of their attacks/infiltrations and tactics. 
Variation could be in the physical features on the barriers, such as in the technologies, the 
land variables, the policing dimensions, the materials barriers are made of, their height 
etc. For non-state actors, their institutions and resources may vary and as a result the 
number of their attacks will also vary as well as their tactics. 
Even within the Palestinian context, Israel is building a barrier around the West 
Bank. This barrier varies from that of Gaza at many different levels. For instance, unlike 
the Gaza barrier, the West bank Barrier is still an unfinished project and is subject to so 
much controversy. It is a much more extensive project but none of its sections entirely 
encircles the Palestinian areas, except in the case of Qalqilya.  The cement sections of the 
barrier are much longer than those of the Gaza barrier. Yet, attacks from the area in 
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general declined especially in the last three years or so. Tunnel attacks were not used at 
all and very few rockets were launched from the West Bank on Israel and Israeli 
settlements. Most if not all the attacks from the West Bank today take the form of 
settlements and roadside bombings.  
The paradox is unlike the Gaza fence, the West bank barrier does not fully 
encircle the Palestinian areas but the expanding Israeli settlements and restricted roads 
perform the role of a barrier. However, the West Bank is a lot more proximate to the 
Israeli centers and settlements but attacks in the area take a different form from those of 
Gaza. Knowing that the West Bank lacks networks to parallel Gaza’s tunnels is one of the 
significant differences between the two areas; it would be very informative to compare 
the Gaza case to the West Bank.  
In the Middle East, a less known barrier is that between Syria and Turkey. Hatay, 
also known as Alexandretta, used to be part of the Syrian territory but France ceded the 
area to Turkey in 1939, hoping to coax the Turks away from Nazi Germany. However, 
Syrian maps still show the region as part of Syria and as result Turkey fenced the borders. 
Later in the 1980s, Turkey also mined about 500 miles of the borders in the late 1980s 
because of infiltration of Kurdish insurgents. While the mines were removed in 2004, it 
would be interesting to look at the effect of this barrier on the PKK’s (Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party) attacks in Turkey (US, Israel, 2004; Turkey Gets, 2008). It would be also 
informative to compare this case to the cases of Gaza and the West Bank. 
Another interesting case is the fences built around the Spanish enclaves of Cebta 
and Mellila. Spain fenced off its enclaves Cebta and Melilla to stop illegal migrant and 
drug trafficking from Morocco to Europe (Saddiki, 2010). The Spanish authorities 
supplied their fences with advances surveillance technologies in an attempt to stop 
infiltrations. The Spanish civil guards, the police and the army cooperate in chasing 
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infiltrators deep into the Spanish territories and in many cases infiltrators are actually 
arrested (Andreas, 2000: 127-32). The borders however are still known of active illegal 
crossings. In many instances infiltrators bribe the border-guards; hide their commodities 
in legal cargos or swim around the fence (Oliver, 2007:14). Although emphasis in this 
case is on stopping illegal crossings, comparing it to the Palestinian cases for example 
may provide many theoretical and empirical insights. 
The above-mentioned cases, give different examples of barriers with various 
materials, technologies, buffer zones etc. non-state actors crossing the borders also 
employ different tactics. Attempting at testing the hypotheses about the interaction 
between barriers, non-state actors’ institutions and attacks/infiltrations in other contexts 
will deliver many theoretical, empirical and policy implications. 
Knowing that a decision by a policy-maker to fence off an area affects the life of 
many people, it has become imperative to question the vitality of these constructions. In 
many of the above mentioned cases, barriers not only separated people from each other 
but also some also separated families on different sides of the perceived borders. Barriers 
at another level indeed limit the resources for militants but they also do so for average 
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